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Abstract 
This dissertation was written as part of the LLM in Transnational and European 
Commercial Law/ Banking Law/ Arbitration/ Mediation of the International Hellenic 
University. 
The present dissertation constitutes an analysis of patent law applied on the emerging 
biotechnological inventions. Biotechnology inserted many innovations which are on 
benefit of humanity especially in the field of medicine and agriculture.  Due to the fact 
that biotechnology procedures are something completely new, many doubts had 
arisen concerning the morality of the biotechnological inventions and the preservation 
of public ordre. On this paper are analyzed some of the most important cases that the 
EPO has deal with and that all of them had provoke morality issues and matters 
concerning public ordre on behalf of patentability of the inventions. Specifically, the 
dissertation focuses on the application and the problematics of Article 53(a) which 
inserts the exceptions of patentability in the sector of Animal Genetics, Human 
Genetics and Plant Genetics. 
Stefania Kafazi 
Thessaloniki, 10.02.2019 
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 THE PATENT SYSTEM  
 1Ιn Europe under the EPC and in the US a patent constitutes an intellectual 
property right. It is a negative right that is granted by the state and which provides 
the patentee with the right to exclude others from using, or exploiting, the invention 
without his consent. According to the European Patent Contract (and the Agreement 
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 1994; henceforth TRIPS), the 
right is limited in time to 20 years from the date of filing the application. Also, a patent 
is valid only in the jurisdiction of the patent office by which it is granted. In fact, a 
patent does not provide the patentee with the right to exploit the invention. The right 
only prevents third parties from exploiting the invention without the consent of the 
patentee. National regulatory authorities are the one which control the exploitation. 
The aim of the patent system, both in Europe under the EPC and the US, is to promote 
invention and new industries. The patent system is simple. The state grants to the 
inventor the right of patentability of his invention in return for public disclosure of 
how to work the invention. The interests of the inventor and those of the public must 
be balanced. Despite the fact that it seems like the patent system operates in favour 
of private individuals and that it creates a monopoly, there are restrictions which have 
to be observed. Firstly, a patent can be granted only for an invention. Secondly, the 
rights which are given to the patentee in respect of his invention are exclusive and 
certain. Thirdly, the given rights to the inventor are not at all permanent as regards 
their nature.  
 Specification 
 2In addition, according to the European patent system, under the EPC and the 
Directive, there are some restraints in respect of patentability, one of which has to do 
with the patent specification. The specification refers to a sufficient and clear 
description of the invention. Giving to the patentee the right of patentability for his 
                                                          
1Mills Oliver, Biotechnological Inventions, Moral restraints and Patent Law, Revised Edition, Chapter 1, 
2010 
2Mills Oliver, Biotechnological Inventions, Moral restraints and Patent Law, Revised Edition, Chapter 1, 
2010 
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invention, he is obliged to teach the public on how to work on his invention, in return 
to his temporary monopoly in his invention. Therefore, the specification of the patent 
discloses the invention. In addition, the scope of the monopoly may be defined by 
means of the claims. Those claims must be clear, precise and to correspond to the 
description. Α patent can be granted  only if the specification teaches how 
to reproduce the inventor’ s claims. The disclosure of the invention to the public must 
be adequate in order for the patentee to grant a temporary monopoly in his invention. 
 Criteria 
 3In Europe, under the EPC and the Directive, and the US, an invention is 
patentable if it satisfies three criteria: 
• the invention must be new (novelty- non obviousness in the US). 
• the invention must entail an inventive activity (inventive step- utility in the US). 
• the invention must be susceptible of industrial application. 
 1) The condition of “new” invention: 
 4According to the European Contract, the evaluation of the condition of “new” 
includes the research of whether the invention belongs or not to “the state of art”, 
meaning in other words, that the invention must not be already known or available to 
the public, through any form or  any written or oral description of public disclosure 
before the date of filing the application for the grant of license of patentability. The 
prior knowledge of any invention is called as “the state of art”. Therefore, the 
condition of “new” will be assessed, based on “the state of art” on the time of the 
submission of the application, so there must be a difference between the invention 
and the “state of art”. If something is already known to the public or is in the  public 
domain, then it is not new or it cannot be a subject of a private monopoly.  
                                                          
3  Mills Oliver, Biotechnological Inventions, Moral restraints and Patent Law, Revised Edition, Chapter 
1, 2010 
 
4 Lafakis Leandros, Biotechnological Inventions, 2004,135 
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 The European approach is similar to the American one (according to which, the 
element of “new” may be interpreted as whether the invention was existing or was 
accessible to the public before the filing of the application of patentability) and 
basically it proceeds the same way of assessing the criterion of “new” invention. 
Especially in the field of biotechnological inventions, the crucial question is out of the 
object of whether the invention existed, and it moves to the question of if someone 
could know for its existence. We perceive that the term “state of art” of the European 
Contract, refers to everything that is known to the public in the past and in the future. 
According to Article 54 of the European Contract “the “state of art” consists of 
everything that is known to the public before the date of the application submission 
….by a written or an oral description, with a use or any other means”. “The state of 
art”, includes “the content of the applications for the European license of patentability 
as they have been submitted…”. 
 It is worth noting that the criterion novelty in the European case law has been 
interpreted in an identical way with the United States case law, without any 
substantial deviation of interpretation. The only difference which affects the case law 
is the advantage of a twelve- month period of grace for the applicants in the United 
States before the registration or oral publication of the invention.  This practice of law 
of the United States allows the publication or the sale of invention without preventing 
the application submission for a license of patentability. On contrast, in the European 
law there is no provision for “a period of grace”. The last few years there are thoughts, 
in Europe, of adopting “a period of grace” as a measure that will prevent the delay of 
publications. On the other hand, big companies in Europe are still against the provision 
of “a period of grace” in the field of national or European patent law, due to the fact 
that this will limit the safe of law for third persons and it could provoke confusion to 
individual inventors, giving them the wrong sense of security.  
 2) The criterion of “inventive activity”: 
 5Each invention must be based on an inventive activity (inventive step). This 
means that every invention must be for each specialist a step for a progress in relation 
                                                          
5 Lefakis Leandros, Biotechnological Inventions, 2004, 137 
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to the state of art. The criterion of “inventive activity” investigates if and in what grade 
an invention is obvious to a person with knowledge and experience in a specific field. 
It relates to the issue of obviousness. On that point, the element of “new” and the 
previous public knowledge does not matter. It is only investigating ipso facto the 
previous relevant “state of art”, in order to be determined if the invention for which 
an application for license patentability has been submitted, constitutes an important 
achievement despite all these which are already known. It requires the invention not 
to be obvious to a person that is ordinary skilled in the art. That is the difference 
between the invention and the “state of art”. 
 In Europe, the criterion of “not obvious” is defined by the criterion of the 
“inventive step”. According to Article 56 of EPC, “It is considered that an invention 
includes an inventive activity, if, according to an expert, it is not inferred in an obvious 
way from the state of art”. This means that the invention must not be expecting or 
predictable in relation to all these that are already known before. 
 3) The criterion of “susceptible to industrial application”: 
 6An invention is considered to have an industrial application, if the object of it 
can be produced or be applied in every productive activity. Meaning that the invention 
may be capable of use in any type of industry. Including agriculture.  According to 
Article 57 of EPC, “an invention is considered to have an industrial application if its 
subject can be manufactured or be used in each industrial sector, including this one of 
agriculture”. If an invention cannot be applied in industry this means that it is not 
beneficial to society, so it does not deserve a patent protection.  
 According to European law, the susceptibility to industrial application of any 
invention must be proved by the inventor who is obliged to prove that there is a fully 
formed invention, capable for use, including the use for research purposes and not via 
the report to the exact way of the industrial use of each invention or on how necessary 
is the product (or the procedure) for the industry. 
                                                          
6 Lefakis Leandros, Biotechnological Inventions, 2004, 138 
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 In the field of modern biotechnology and genetic engineering, the interpretive 
approach of the European Patent Office regarding the industrial application of an 
invention is too interesting. The rapid growth of these sciences and the use of live stuff 
has proved that among all conditions for granting a license for patentability, the most 
important is this of the industrial application, due to that it plays the most sovereign 
factor for the grant of patentability.  
 As mentioned previously, according to EPC, the criteria of industrial application 
is based on the field of the “possible use and not the real one, past or present, as patent 
law dictates that the condition of “new” for an invention is fulfilled only if the invention 
has not been used before the time of the application submission for the grant of license 
of patent”. Therefore, an invention is susceptible to industrial application, only if it is 
possible to be used from the industry and its use suggests in every situation, the future 
use of the subject. In support of this argument we could mention the text of Article 57 
of EPC which supports that “an invention is considered to have an industrial 
application if its subject can be manufactured or be used in each industrial sector…”.  
 It is important to emphasize on the nature of the biotechnological research 
and the huge amounts that biotechnological companies spend, in order to understand 
better the reason why they are looking for protection in patent law in time when the 
real use of an invention has not proved yet but it is just becoming apparent that it will 
follow as a product of research and development. The kind of research that companies 
promote are too competitive and they want to have a higher protection of granting 
monopoly rights, in order to support their position and to negotiate the availability of 
their product to other companies or directly on the market before their competitors.  
 We notice that there is an enlargement in the interpretation of the term 
“industrial application”, regarding the European law. This is accompanied by a 
simultaneous correlation with the so- called “ethical criterion”, based on Article 53 (a) 
of EPC. This article prefers the prohibition of granting patent licenses for inventions 
that their publication or their application is contrary to public order or morality.  
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 BIOTECHNOLOGY 
 7“Biotechnology” refers to a wide range of techniques that use living organisms 
for the production of new products or products that already exist but in improved 
composition. Biotechnology is nowadays the new entry of economy which relies on 
the scientific knowledge and creates new opportunities for the communities and 
national economies.  
 At the beginning of the 21st century, there was a revolution on the basis of 
knowledge in biotechnology that offered new applications in the health care, the 
production of food, the protection of environment and the new scientific inventions.  
 Biotechnology introduces methods for cheaper and more secure production of 
new medicines and medical services. Generally, biotechnology plays an executive role 
in the transition from the traditional way of healing the diseases to a more 
personalized and preventive medicine based on the genetic predisposition, to 
specialized diagnostic tests and to new medication treatments. The 
“pharmacogenomic” which applies information for the human genome for the 
discovery, the design and the development of pharmaceuticals, is believed that will 
contribute more in this change in biotechnology. Research on genetic cells and 
transplantation offers the option for the replacement of tissues and organs for the 
treatment of degenerative diseases and injuries which comes from cerebral 
congestion. 
 In the sector of agricultural foodstuffs, biotechnology has developed the ability 
of production of foods with higher quality and improved cultivation which are not too 
harmful to the environment. The higher quality of foods and animal feed is proved 
that it is connected with the prevention of diseases and the reduction of health 
dangers.  
 Biotechnology has the options to improve the uses of genetic modified 
cultivation which produces food as a source of raw materials for the industries or new 
                                                          
7Mills Oliver, Biotechnological Inventions, Moral restraints and Patent Law, Revised Edition, Chapter 1, 
2010 
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materials such as plastic which are produced with biotechnological methods. These 
methods of genetic transformation contribute to the modification of carbohydrates, 
olive, fat, proteins and production of fibers. In other words, biotechnology offers new 
methods that contribute to the improvement of the environment, the cleaning of 
polluted air, of contaminated soil, water and waste and promotes the development of 
cleaner industrial products kai procedures based on the use of enzymes. 
 Nowadays, we live in a high technological world were biotechnology is one of 
the most new and innovative industries in the field of science so, a strong and 
harmonized patent law is necessary. 
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 BIOTECHNOLOGY AND LAW 
  “CLASSIC” biology: 
 8At first, biotechnological techniques have been using in ancient activities such 
as fermentation, bakery and interbreeding of varieties of animals and plants. Due to 
the fact that all these procedures were very time consuming and unsuccessful as 
regards the factors of stability and repeatability. Moreover, these procedures had an 
increased danger regarding the transfer of undesirable and defective genes which can 
affect unfavorably the behavior of plant and living organisms in the herbal 
environment. Gradually, the sector of “classic” biotechnology started to be developing 
in the field of cultivation of micro- organisms and the manufacture of other 
biotechnological products, such as the organic acids, polysaccharides, enzymes, 
vaccines and hormones. The manufacture of cells was extended to plant cells which 
had as a result the production of vaccines.  
 As regards the choice of rule of law, from the beginning of the development of 
the intellectual property law, especially in the field of biotechnology, there were many 
obstacles for the introduction of biotechnological inventions in the regulatory object 
of patent law. There was the belief that this particular field (patent law), covers 
exclusively “every technique, machine, construction, composition of material or every 
product which comes from these methods”. From this interpretation we realize that 
inventions of life stuff are excluded. Due to the fact that there was not an exact 
provision of law till then, the patent offices in United States and Europe, were refusing 
to provide a patent license for this kind of biotechnological inventions. On the other 
hand, the need for the industry of biotechnology for a legal protection was becoming 
more and more imperative. 
 a. United States 
 9The first objection of the United States for the provision of patent license, 
regarding plants, animals and micro- organisms was relied on that the protection of 
                                                          
8 Lefakis Leandros, Biotechnological Inventions, 2004, 20 
9 Lefakis Leandros, Biotechnological Inventions, 2004, 23 
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something that already exists in nature by the provision of patent license is impossible. 
According to this argument, the theory of “products of nature” has been established10. 
This theory supports that everything that exists in nature is not new and this leads to 
the fact that the disposal of the products of nature and the access to them has to be 
free for everyone. This theory determined the development of case law in the United 
States, regarding the registration of patent licenses for genetically modified micro- 
organisms and products of “live stuff”. The rejection for patent licenses especially for 
inventions of genetically modified micro- organisms was universal.  
 Gradually, the courts started to establish exceptions in the theory of “products 
of nature”, supporting that if the natural or chemical capacity of a mixture, join, 
composition or a natural product could be changed in a such point that it could obtain 
characteristics which are totally different from those that existed in nature and could 
be used for a different purpose, then the provision of patent license was possible, if 
all the preconditions of law have been observed. 
 b. Europe 
 In Europe, the national legal system of every state established different grades 
of protection for the patentability, regarding the inventions including plants, animals 
and live stuff. As regards micro- organisms, United Kingdom established law by which, 
micro- organisms that are in nature, are protected under patentability law, if there 
was a human intervention. This means that the discovery of a micro- organism is not 
enough for the provision of patent license, except if this could lead to the isolation of 
the micro- organism from the environment.11 
 In the field of plant variety, Europe did not refused patentability for plant 
varieties, in contrast to United States. National legislations did not reject “expressis 
verbis” this protection. For example, in 1934, the German Patent Office, accepted an 
application for granting the patentability for a variety of tobacco seeds. Moreover, in 
1949, French growers received a patent license for new types of roses and carnations. 
                                                          
10 Roberts C., The prospects of Success of the National Institute of Health’s Human Genome 
Application, 1994 1 EIPR, 32 
11 Beier F.-K., Crespi R.S., Sraus J., Biotechnology and Patent Protection-An international Review, 
OECD, Paris, 1985,52 
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That was the main reason for which, post- war, the industry of the United States 
proceeded to the vote of law for the Protection the Plant Variety in 1970 (Plant Variety 
Protection Act 1974).12 
 In the field of animal species, in 1969 the Supreme Court of Germany 
(Bundesgerichtshof), has dealt with patent licenses for animal breeds. In case Rote 
Taube, the court decided that the animals and the way the farming methods can be 
suspended under the protection of patent law. Despite this fact, in the decision of the 
court, it was mentioned that in theory, there is a possibility of legal protection of 
animals but in practice, every invention has to fulfil the criterion of repeatability.  
 “MODERN” BIOLOGY 
 13The new era of biotechnology started with the discovery of the double helical 
structure of DNA. This was the point at which a tight genetic search started. This 
knowledge made possible the study of the genetic composition of a cell and its natural 
behavior within every organism. “New” biology means that the researcher deepens in 
the structure of the “genetic machine” with a purpose to adapt the cell to his research 
purposes. In other words, he starts from an existing micro- organism and he 
recombines its genetic material, creating in this way a new “modified” organism. As 
mentioned before, this activity is called “genetic machine” or “technology of a 
recombined DNA”. The method of the recombination applies in micro- organisms, 
plant varieties and animal species.  
 The genetic engineering changed the form of biotechnological industry. It not 
only improved the existing methods and practices but also it contributed in the 
creation and the introduction of new products. “New” biology consented to the 
promotion of science knowledge in fields such as medicine, chemical industry and 
agricultural- animal production. Moreover, through the scientific methods of cloning, 
researchers managed to locate, to decipher and to direct the procedures of 
reproduction.14 
                                                          
12 Scalise D.G, Nugent D. International Intellectual Property, 93 
13 Lefakis Leandros, Biotechnological Inventions, 2004, 25 
14 Beier F.-K., Crespi R.S., Sraus J., Biotechnology and Patent Protection-An international Review, 450 
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 In the field of agriculture, the scientists modified plant and animal varieties 
with a purpose the production of products with a higher nutritional value. 
Furthermore, they tried to reproduce animal species which specific characteristics and 
plants with higher resistance to diseases, drought and cold. Genetic techniques had a 
great contribution in the protection of species under danger, especially in cases where 
the traditional techniques of reproduction did not have the same results.  
 The creation of transgenic animals with the introduction of foreign genes in 
the organism of animals, allowed the transportation of genetic material from one 
species to the other in short time. The completion of the decoding of human genetic 
code was the reason of understanding the “phenomenon of life”. This high amount of 
new knowledge could possibly lead to the verification of the causes of incurable 
diseases and their prevention. The prenatal diagnosis of diseases is a fact. The genetics 
therapy and the transplantation of embryonic cells are nowadays methods of 
substitution of defective genes.  
 a. United States 
 The provision of patent licenses for biotechnological products was the most 
important assurance that the investors would have the exclusive privilege of 
exploitation, as an assurance of their investment activity. On the other hand, the 
generator will enjoy the benefit from the marketing of each product.  
 In the field of case law, the Supreme Court of United States (U. S. Supreme 
Court), at the case Diamond Vs Chakrabarty, reached to the conclusion that “object of 
patentability could be every human creation”. With this decision, the Supreme Court 
of United States started a new era in the American industry of biotechnology. 
Regarding the sector of research, genetic engineering established as “a worldwide 
option of technological improvement, which could produce spectacular results if it 
was secured under the protection of Intellectual Patent Law”.15 
 b. Europe 
 The three sources of justice which regulate the patentability are: 
                                                          
15 Scalise D.G., Nugent D., Patenting Living Matter, 1005 
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a) the national law of each state, b) The Contract for the award of European Patents 
(European Contract or Contract of Munich) and c) the 98/44/EC Directive for the “legal 
protection of biotechnological inventions”. 
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 PATENT LAW AND BIOTECHNOLOGY: MORALITY RESTRAINTS 
 The application of Article 53 of the European Patent Contract 
 1. Introduction 
 Article 53 introduces two exceptions in the basic principle of granting patents. 
Basically, it prohibits the granting of European patents for inventions whose 
publication or application is contrary to “public order” or morality.16 According to the 
European Patent Office, these restrictions must be interpreted very narrow. This is not 
just a European practice as the United States and Japan apply the same practice as 
regards the evaluation of ethical criteria. This homogenization of patent law, 
especially in the field of the emerging technologies, contributed to the restructuring 
of the existing regulatory object. The reconstruction had a double meaning. On one 
hand the object of protection “was interpreted more extensively” and on the other 
hand, “the restrictions were interpreted narrowly”.17  
 Especially in the field of biotechnological inventions, the broadening of the 
regulatory field became possible with the production of legal arguments, aiming at 
the “limitation of legislative exceptions for the grant of patent licenses”. The legal 
science had to adapt to the changing technology needs. The arguments regarding the 
patentability of biotechnological inventions had at first to have as a guide the 
character of the patentability law and the broader perception on social ethics and not 
any private financial interests.  
 Within the framework of case- law of the European Patent Office, the issue of 
morality and public order in the field of biotechnological inventions was put on for the 
first time in the case of Lubrizol (Plant Gene Expression), in which, many NGOs had 
lodged appeals, supporting that patentability claims for plants impinges on the 
regulation of Article 53 (a) of EPC and therefore must be rejected as objectively in the 
rules of ethics. In that case, the Board of Appeal, considered that the provision of 
Article 53 (a) is applicable only in “particularly exceptional cases”.18 The case of 
                                                          
16 Lefakis Leandros, Biotechnological Inventions, 2004,169 
17 Drachos P., Botechnology Patents, Markets and Morality, Paper of Lecture, May 1999, 4 
18 Overwalle Van G., The Legal Protection, 26 
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Krebsmaus/ Harvard II is a characteristic one in which, the provision of Article 53 (a) 
of EPC was seen as an argument for the rejection of granting patentability for an 
invention regarding a transgenic animal.  
 Generally, in Krebsmaus/ Harvard II case, the basic issues that the European 
Patent Office had to face was the examination of whether the creation of a transgenic 
animal is contrary to morality and public order.  The European Patent Office proceed 
to the balance of interests between the pain of the animal and the potential risk to 
the environment and on the other hand, the benefit of humanity through the fight 
against cancer. The EPC judged that the advantages of the invention (contribution to 
the development of new and improved therapies against human cancer) were more 
important and above the disadvantages. It also considered that this invention was not 
contrary to morality. In other words, it concluded that morality and pubic order were 
not threatened from the purpose of public health that the invention was serving. On 
the other hand, in another similar case, the patentability application of the Upjohn 
company was rejected, due to the fact that the European Patent Office supported that 
the benefit of humanity could not be weighed with the animals’ pain. The applicable 
method of the genetic engineering contributed to the production of animals with 
embedded genes susceptible to the challenge of cancer, which were aiming at the 
detecting of the genes that produce more hair. 
 The examination of morality took also place in the H2- Relaxin case. The Board 
of Appeal confirmed on January 1995 the European license of patentability with No 
112 1449, which was concerned the gene that contained human relaxin hormone (H2- 
relaxin), rejecting the relevant appeal that the party of the Greens had submitted. It 
was supported that the grant of patentability will lead to a possible equation of the 
meaning of invention with this of discovery. The basic argument, according to the 
president of the party, was that this kind of license patentability had to be cancelled 
as opposite to morality due to the fact that it was connected to a DNA that contains 
human relaxin hormone. The vesting of such a gene affects human dignity and is 
contrary to article 53 (a) of EPC as it has been isolated from a pregnant woman for 
speculative purposes. The European Patent Office supported that this woman has not 
been affected from the isolation of the gene, as she had previously consent. 
19 
 
Furthermore, the EPO stated that DNA is not considered “life itself”, but it is a chemical 
substance which carries genetic information and that could probably be used as a 
means for the production of proteins that are medically useful. The EPO did not find 
any moral difference between the patentability of human genes and patentability of 
other human substances, as through the cloning of genes, many important human 
proteins were put into use for medical science. In this case, the EPO used as an 
argument the principle of proportionality and the purpose of public health which the 
invention serves. 19 
 A license of patentability was also given to the University of Edinburgh (known 
as “the Edinburgh patent”) on December of 1999 with No 0695351 from the EPO. This 
patent considers a method of genetic modification of “animal stem cells”. Due to that 
the EPO did not limit the term “animal” it was thought that this term could also be 
applied for humans. This resulted in the submission of many appeals from March of 
2000. The arguments on which these appeals based were that the patentability is 
contrary to morality and that it could lead to the vesting of human stem cells or to the 
genetic modification or the protection of methods of human cloning. The University 
of Edinburgh responded that it had no intention to expand the protection of 
patentability to the creation of transgenic human organisms. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
19 Lefakis Leandros, Biotechnological Inventions, 2004, 173 
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 2. The nature of the moral criterion 
 a) The exception of Article 53 (a)- A general view  
 20The application of Article 53 (a) in a stable and appropriate way is necessary, 
in order to protect biotechnological inventions. As regards the consequences of the 
application of article 53 (a) of the EPC, it is of huge importance to examine the meaning 
of terms “public order” and “morality” in the EPC. The only reference in the whole text 
of EPC of those terms is negative. Article 53 (a) of the EPC deals with unpatentable 
inventions in terms of “public ordre” and “morality”. The full text of Article 53 (a) is 
the following: 
 European patents shall not be granted in respect of: 
 (a) inventions the commercial exploitation of which would be contrary to “ordre 
public” or “morality”, provided that the exploitation shall not be deemed to be so 
contrary merely because it is prohibited by law or regulation in some or all of the 
Contracting States.  
 In other words, the application of an invention cannot be regarded as a matter 
of public order or morality simply because it has been prohibited by law or a regulation 
in all contracting states or in one or some of them. The real meaning of this provision 
is that the answer of whether the application of an invention is contrary to public order 
or morality must not be judged by a mere comparison of the provisions of the law or 
the corresponding regulations.21 Therefore, even if the application of an invention is 
legal in all contracting states, the departments of the European Office have the 
possibility to reach to the conclusion that this invention must be rejected as being 
contrary to the provisions of Article 53 (a).22 So, special agencies are those who defines 
the meanings of “public order” and “morality” in each case.  
 The Guidelines of the European Patent Office are given also to the examiners 
of the application of the provision of Article 53 (a). On these Guidelines, it is 
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mentioned that the reliance on the provision “should only be made in rare and 
extreme cases”. An appropriate examination method “is based on the view of whether 
it is likely that the public will regard the invention as abusive as the patent is 
indiscriminate”.23 
 The application of the provision of Article 53 (a) as ultimum refugium from the 
European Patent Office is clear. This does not hinder the maintenance of vagueness, 
regarding the delimitation of the terms “public order” and “morality”. A specific part 
of the theory supported that public opinion must be taken into account. In the field of 
biotechnology, this issue was raised in Relaxin case (the case is mentioned above). The 
competent Board of Appeal answered in a relevant request that taking into account 
the public opinion was not an obligation of the EPO, as the burden of proof lies on the 
applicant. But even if this was procedural admissible, “there would not be a license of 
patentability- especially in the field of biotechnology- for which the consensus of 
public opinion would not be sought in the form of a poll”.24 
 In the Plant Genetic Systems case, the Belgian biotechnological industry “Plant 
Genetic Systems” with a seat in Ghent, deposited an application to the EPO for 
granting a license of patentability for an invention that with a title “plant cells resistant 
to inhibitors of the glutamine synthesis”. The license of patentability was granted. The 
ecological organization Greenpeace, which was against this granting of patentability, 
presented the results of the poll which was conducted by it. Greenpeace supported 
that this invention which concerned genetically modified herbicide resistant plants 
was inadmissible of patent license according to Article 53 (a). Despite the fact that 
Greenpeace supported that the polls were a proof of the public opinion, the Board of 
Appeal of the EPO rejected those results with the argument that “such findings can 
rarely be considered decisive in assessing whether the object under examination is 
patentable”.25 The polls may fluctuate within short periods of time as a result of 
influences that the public opinion accepts. That is the reason why the criterion of 
morality must be assessed on a case- by- case basis. The fact that a poll shows that 
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24 Sterckx S. , European Patent Law, 27 
25 Decision T356/93, Official Journal EPO, 1995, 545 
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group of people or a majority of population of a contracting state is opposite to the 
grant of patentability of a particular invention, cannot be a sufficient justification for 
reaching to a conclusion that this invention is contrary to public order or morality.  
 In Plant Genetic Systems case, the Board of Appeal made an attempt to define 
the terms of “public order” and “morality”. The Board of Appeal decided that there is 
not an exact and unique perception about the elements which consist the terms of 
public order and morality. Especially, regarding the meaning of “public order” it 
concluded that “it is generally accepted that public order includes the principles of 
public security, the physical integrity of individuals as members of the society and the 
protection of the environment. Therefore, according to Article 53 (a), inventions 
whose application may probably cause the violation of public order or the social peace 
(e.g. the application of an invention to terrorist actions) or the damage of the 
environment must be excepted from the granting of patentability licenses as they 
must be considered as opposite to the public order.  
 b) The public ordre 
 26According to the European Patent Contract and the case law of the European 
Patent Office and as told previously, public order aims at public security, the physical 
integrity of individuals as members of the society and the protection of the 
environment. As regards the protection of the environment, the truth is that in 
practice, in most cases and especially in the field of biotechnological inventions, the 
deposit of an application for the grant of patent license take place in an early stage of 
development, so the environmental consequences are very difficult to be assessed.  
 Despite this fact, the EPO, in the Relaxin case which concerns products of 
genetic engineering, made the conclusion that “the proof of evidence regarding the 
extent of environmental damages of an invention lies on the applicant. The fact that 
the applicant may not be able to prove the possible danger of an invention is not 
paradoxical. The last fifteen years, specialists in all over the world try intensively to 
limit the issue of dangers that are connected to genetic engineering and especially 
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with the production and the release of genetical modified organisms in nature. 
Despite the attempts that have been made, there is still not an agreement about the 
extent of those dangers… and the same problem still concerns the examiners of the 
EPO. If the examiners may attempt to limit those dangers, the results would probably 
be arbitrary and superficial and unfair for some of the parties”. 
 On the contrary, the Board of Appeal, in the Plant Genetic Systems case, took 
a different position. It supported that the granting of patent license may be rejected 
if the application of an invention may cause serious environmental damage. A 
precondition for the rejection of patentability is the fact that the dangers for the 
environment have been properly and adequately proven on the time when the 
procedure of examination of patentability takes place from the EPO. Specifically, the 
Board of Appeal stated that “the rejection of an application of patentability with the 
justification that the invention may cause a damage to the environment, according to 
Article 53 (a) must be adequately proven on the time of the examination of 
patentability by the EPO”.27 Otherwise, it would be unjustified to reject the 
patentability with the justification of “a suspected and unsafe risk”.28 The Board’s of 
Appeal point of view seems to be problematic and in any case not sufficiently 
documented, as in the era we live is too difficult to ask for a sufficient proof for the 
environmental dangers of inventions for the environment. This kind of proof will 
probably come out of the results and will be irreversible. The best solution in a 
European level and for similar cases is the establishment of a special legislation.  
 c) Morality 
 29As regards morality, the Department of Appeals of the European Patent 
Office in Plant Genetic Systems case formulated the following definition: “the meaning 
of morality is totally connected with the belief that a behavior is right and acceptable 
and another behavior is wrong”. The correctness of this belief is founded on the 
acceptable standards which are deeply rooted in a particular spiritual culture. 
According to the European Patent Contract, a spiritual culture is the one that is 
                                                          
27 Decision T 356/93, 21 February 1995 
28 Decision T  356/93, 21 February 1995 
29Lefakis Leandros, Biotechnological Inventions, 2004, 179  
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inherent in the European society and the European culture. Therefore, according to 
the provision of Article 53 (a), the inventions, the application of which does not comply 
with the conventionally accepted behavioral criteria which are appropriate for the 
European society and the European culture must be excepted from the grant of 
patentability licenses as being contrary to morality. 
 The truth is that the limitation and the assessment of the meaning of 
“morality” is too complicated due to the “ethical neutrality” which is invoked by the 
Patent Law and the complexity of the discourse of moral concerns in the field of 
biotechnology. Regarding the criterion of morality of an invention is fair to be assessed 
not only in the final stage of the examination of patentability but in more early stages 
or in more stages of the research and development of an invention. On that point, the 
basic question is who will have the right to assess the ethical criterion of the 
inventions? This right must be given at first to the Patent Offices that are taken on a 
daily basis with applications of patentability. In any case, the legislation is the one that 
is going to give a Guideline to the examiners of patentability of an invention to assess 
a behavior within the field of the European society and culture. On national level, 
regarding the exceptions, the meaning of morality must be interpreted not in relation 
to patent law per se but on the basis of the real legal and ethical order that apply in 
each of the contracting states.  
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  Animal Genetics and Article 53 (a) 
 30As regards the field of animal genetics, the case of Onco- Mouse is 
characteristic. In April 1989 the United States Patent and Trademark Office granted a 
license of patentability for the first patent on an animal to the President and Fellows 
of Harvard College. What researchers had done was to produce transgenic mice whose 
germ and somatic cells contained an activated onco-gene sequence. The sequence of 
the activated onco- genes was introduced into the animal at its early embryonic stage. 
This genetic modification resulted in the increase of the probability of the 
development of malignant tumors. 
 On this occasion, two applications for a patent were made to the EPO, making 
an invocation of Article 53(a) EPC.31 The first application related to a process claim and 
concerned a method of producing a genetically engineered mouse. The second 
application related to a product claim, so in fact was a claim to the mouse itself. 
 Initially, the Examining Division of the EPO rejected both applications but 
during the hearing the Examining Division supported that patent law, and Article 53(a) 
EPC in particular, was not the appropriate provision of law for regulating problems 
which arise and are connected with the genetic modification of organisms.  
 On appeal, the Technical Board had a different opinion regarding the 
Examining Division argument. The Board stated that in cases like the present there 
were specific reasons why the implications of Article 53(a) EPC should be taken 
seriously into consideration. First, the insertion of onco-genes into mammalian 
animals was possible to cause suffering. Second, the release of modified organisms 
into the general environment is possible to cause irreversible adverse effects. 
According to the Board, its support on the application of Article 53(a) EPC depended 
upon weighing two factors. The one is the suffering of animals and the possible risks 
of damage to the environment and the second, the fact of how useful is the invention 
to humanity. Finally, the Examining Division decided in the applicant’s favour. The 
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main issue which was examined was whether or not the subject-matter of the 
applications was contrary to ordre public or morality within the meaning of Article 
53(a) EPC.  
 Considering the decision of the Board and the interest of public to patenting 
animals, the Examining Division issued a statement on the matter, which may be 
described as EPO ‘policy’ on patenting transgenic animals. The EPO argued that all new 
technology is accompanied by risks but this itself should not lead to a negative attitude 
towards the technology in general. The possible risks which the technology may bring 
must be assessed according to its beneficial results, so that an informed opinion to be 
formed regarding of whether or not the technology should be used. In respect of the 
patentability of an invention, morality must be examined, and possible dangerous 
effects and risks must be weighed in accordance with the invention’s advantages. In 
the present case there were three different issues that were considered: 
• those of humanity, regarding the treatment of diseases; 
• those of the protection of the environment from damages; 
• those of the suffering of animals from test experiments. 
 The Examining Division considered that protection of the environment and the 
suffering of animals caused by the testing of the results of the invention, are two main 
reasons of prohibiting the patentability of the invention in respect of Article 
53(a), unless the advantages of the invention for humanity are possible to overcome 
such negative concerns. The Examining Division, while assessing the benefits to 
mankind, it reached to the following considerations:  
• Cancer was one of the diseases which causes a premature death in many countries 
of the world. The development of biology, regarding new and improved anti-cancer 
treatments considers the invention valuable and useful to mankind.  
• The testing of treatment by the induction of cancer in one animal had as a result to 
reduce the number of animals that was previously used for such experimental 
purposes 
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• Regarding the cancer research in this particular case was shown that animal test 
models were the most necessary and appropriate.32 
• The purpose of the invention must be taken into consideration in accordance with 
the risks of the damage of the environment. Since the use of animal test models was 
taking place only in a laboratory, under specific conditions by qualified staff, there was 
not any intention for a release into the environment. The fact that the risk for an 
uncontrolled release may happen due to an inappropriate use of technology could not 
be a major fact of assessing whether or not to grant a patent. 
• An exclusion of an invention from patentability could not be justified on how 
dangerous a technology could be. Specialized government authorities are those who 
regulate the handling of dangerous material and not the EPO.  
 In respect of all these factors, the Examining Division concluded that the 
invention could not be considered to be contrary to Article 53 (a) so as to prevent it 
from granting patentability. Although, it argued that all these considerations outlined 
above, apply exclusively in this specific case. As regards other cases of transgenic 
animals that may arise, it could be possible to reach to a different conclusion in 
applying Article 53 (a).   
 Comments on the statement of the Examining Division: 
• The development on emerging technologies, including biotechnology is 
accompanied by risks. Biotechnology, in the field of patent law must be regulated as 
any other technologies. The EPO adopted the position of broadening the limits of 
morality test, including more intentions which previously were outside the scope of 
morality exclusions. Such categories are inventions that relates to nuclear energy, 
anti-personnel devices, chemical warfare agents, defoliants and battery cultivation. 
• All types of technology must be assessed under the provision of Article 53 (a). 
Biotechnological inventions and more specifically genetic engineering inventions must 
not be excluded per se from patent protection. 
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• The protection of environment is also including in the ambit of the morality 
provision. Article 53(a) prohibits the patentability of inventions the publication or 
exploitation of which would be contrary to ordre public or morality. EPO policy 
supports that the environmental threats of an invention fall under the prohibitions of 
Article 53 (a) only under the terms of “morality” and and that has nothing to do with 
“public ordre”. However, there are cases of environmental issues that may have an 
impact under the terms of “public ordre”. Such a case was the Onco-Mouse but the 
Examining Division overlooked to examine the meaning of environmental threat as 
regards “public ordre” in order to clarify the law in this area. The element of 
“intention” in assessing the environmental threats is a crucial condition. In the 
absence of it, granting patentability cannot be refused only on the basis of 
environmental threat. 
• The EPO established the criteria according to which it must be determined when 
Article 53 (a) applies. The suffering caused to animals and the threats of the 
environment on one hand and the benefits to mankind on the other are the main 
issues that must be assessed and a balance between them must be found. Despite 
this, in Onco-Mouse case there was not any method of applying those criteria in 
determining the patentability of the invention, reaching to the conclusion that criteria 
must be followed by proper guidance for the application, because if there is not any, 
then there are of little benefit for the applicants.  
• The EPO’s considerations regard only to the Onco- Mouse case and we cannot make 
any report for an EPO “policy” in respect of Article 53 (a) EPC. 
• The fact that EPO insists on that all emerging technologies must be assessed under 
Article 53 (a), shows that EPO’ s jurisdiction goes much farther from the Guidelines for 
Examination. According to the Guidelines, morality must be assessed by a “fair test” 
approach. This approach requires that the exploitation of an invention is considered 
immoral before patentability can be excluded. Although, the EPO insists on the 
application of Article 53(a) which must be assessed on the basis of “balancing of 
interests” that is wider than the “fair test” approach. 
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 In Onco-Mouse case, the author does not assess the general public opposition 
towards the invention. He does not estimate the fact that animal loss is overwhelming 
the probable human benefit. However, there is a later case, namely the Upjohn’s 
Application33 which has some differences from the Onco- mouse case. This case 
regards an invention which relates to a transgenic mouse which was modified to 
provide a model for supporting a research in finding methods to enhance hair growth. 
The main objection of the examiners was the lack of an “inventive step” of the 
invention, in general and the other objection concerned the morality of such an 
invention. The objection about morality related to the fact that one of the genes which 
were suggested to be inserted into the mouse was an onco- gene. Upjohn could delete 
this onco- gene without any negative effect and change of the main claim and was 
able to redraft the application for patentability. In this way, the claims of the 
application that left were valid and finally the patent allowed.  
  Regarding the case of the University of Edinburgh which was mentioned above, 
(known as the Edinburgh patent) we assess it as more didactic among the other cases 
analyzed before. The University of Edinburgh applied for a patent of animal transgenic 
stem cells. The EPO granted the license patent depending on the Biotechnology 
Directive. Due to public opposition against the patent and reactions by the 
governments of Germany, Italy and the Netherlands, the University changed its claims, 
limiting the application to non-humans. The Opposition Division argued that despite 
that the original application was in violation of Article 53(a) EPC, the amended claims 
did not.  EPO’ s practice shows that it is not strict enough on applying the morality 
provisions of EPC and the Directive. 
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 Human Genetics and Article 53(a) 
 34In the case of Howard Florey/ Relaxin (known as Relaxin case), the application 
of Article 53(a) was one of the main issues. The case concerned a patent for a 
genetically engineered human hormone whose existence was not recognized before. 
At first, the invention granted patentability by the Examining Division of the EPO in 
April 1991 but later was opposed. The main claim of the opponents was that DNA 
sequence was offended against Article 53(a) EPC. All objections were denied by the 
Opposition Division. Due to the rejection of the Opposition Division, one of the 
opponents submitted an appeal that is pending before the Technical Board of Appeal. 
 In the Reasons for the Decision, the Opposition Division argued the following 
in respect of the application of Article 53(a): 
Article 53 (a) must be the provision according to which it will be assessed in each case 
whether the invention is universally acceptable or not. This kind of interpretation 
reflects to the “fair test” approach as is analyzed in the context of the Guidelines for 
Examination which support that Article 53(a) should be applied only in rare and 
specific cases. 
 By supporting the “fair test” approach of the Guidelines, the Opposition 
Division is not applying a strict moral regime in respect of the provision of Article 53(a). 
Article 53(a) establishes an exception to the general principles of patentability which 
are set out in Article 52(1) EPC according to which, patents should be granted for 
inventions, in all fields of technology if they fulfil the conditions of industrial 
applicability, novelty and this of the inventive step. Boards of Appeal apply narrowly 
the all these conditions. The Opposition Division supports that it would be contrary to 
the beliefs of majority of the public if the inventio referred to the patentability of 
human life, the abuse of pregnant women, or the slavery and the piecemeal sale of 
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women. Despite all these, the Opposition Division refused that the invention included 
any of these prohibited facts. 
 We can say that the decision of Opposition Division sets the principles for cases 
which may arise in future regarding of what constitutes an invention that must be 
excluded from patentability. As regards the immorality of patenting human genes, the 
Opposition Division supported that all these claims are based on the majority in the 
Contracting States (the “overwhelming consensus” criterion) that granting a patent 
for human genes is abhorrent and should be precluded on the grounds of the provision 
of Article 53(a). Although, according to the Opposition Division’ s opinion, such a claim 
was untrue.  
 In respect of the application of Article 53(a), the “overwhelming consensus” 
criterion that the Opposition Division had adopted in the Relaxin case is more 
reasonable than the “balance of interests” test that the Examining Division had 
adopted in Onco-Mouse case. Among these criteria, the “overwhelming consensus” 
test is the one that sets the limits to the EPO to refuse patentability. In fact, the 
decision supports that the controlling factor of the patentability of an invention is the 
consensus between the Contracting State about the morality of it. This means that the 
EPO or other European Institutions have not the inherent power to decide whether an 
invention constitutes an abhorrent one or not. The decision supports that Article 53(a) 
promotes states’ power to preclude patentability of an invention based on morality 
factors. However, the EPC had no intention to charge the EPO with concerns about 
the moral aspects of patentability. The fact that the Opposition Division is part of the 
EPO and its decisions differ from those of the Examining Division, there is an absolute 
confusion in the Office regarding the application of Article 53(a). 
 Furthermore, in respect to the application of Article 53(a) and its issues, there 
are three recent cases which involve breast cancer genes. These cases which were 
referred to the Technical Board of Appeal, concern the University of Utah Research 
Foundation (as patent proprietor) and Opposition Division decisions. Case T 1213/0535 
is about an appeal against the decision of the Opposition Division which supported 
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that European Patent No. 0 705 902 could be maintained in a modified form as it had 
argued that the main request did not fulfil the requirements of Article 123(2) and (3) 
and Article 84 EPC). The patent was named “17 q-linked breast and ovarian cancer 
susceptibility gene”. 
 In examining the appeal, the Technical Board had to answer to arguments 
concerning the reasons why the claimed subject-matter was excluded from 
patentability on the grounds of the provision of Article 53(a). Firstly, the opponents 
supported that there was anything to prove that the donors of the cells used to 
identify the breast cancer gene (BCRA1) had consent after giving them the proper 
information. The absence of such a crucial proof, leads to the assumption that the 
results of the initial research include violations that are contrary to public ordre or 
morality as mentioned in Article 53(a). The answer of the Board to the above 
argument was that there was no provision in the EPC which was predicting that a 
previous informed consent of the applicant was required. Therefore, the Board 
rejected the argument that the claimed subject-matter was excluded due to violation 
of Article 53(a). Secondly, the opponents argued that there were socio-economic 
consequences of the patenting of the claimed subject-matter and that these 
consequences constitute ethical matters, due to that they will not only increase the 
costs for patients, but also diagnosis and research in Europe would be affected. As an 
answer, the Board referred to the interpretation of Article 53(a) and argued that 
according to it (Article 53(a)) patenting is forbitten in cases where “exploitation of the 
invention” and not “exploitation of the patent” is contrary to ordre public or morality. 
Depending on this argument, the Technical Board rejected this objection. 
 Another case in which appeals (by the patent proprietor and opponents) were 
lodged, is the case T 0666/0548. In this case, the appeals were lodged once more, 
against the decision of the Opposition Division regarding the European Patent no. 0 
705 903. The Opposition Division judged that this patent  could be granted in amended 
form. The patent was giving the right for “mutations in the 17 q-linked breast and 
ovarian cancer susceptibility gene”. The main argument of the opponents was that in 
accordance to Article 53 (a), methods for the diagnosis of a predisposition for breast 
and ovarian cancer should not be considered as patentable inventions, due to the fact 
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that the provision of this Article forbids patenting of inventions which regard methods 
of treatment for the human or the animal body by surgery or therapy, and diagnostic 
methods which are practiced on the human or animal body. On the above argument, 
the Board answered that Article’s 53(a) exclusion from patentability, regards only 
diagnostic methods which are practiced on the human or animal body36 but only if the 
technical methods performed on the preceding and which constitute a substantive 
factor for making the diagnosis are applied on a living human or animal body. 
Therefore, the opponent’s argument was rejected by the Board on this basis. Another 
argument of the opponent is that the claimed subject-matter of the invention creates 
ethical issues and this leads to the conclusion that patentability of that particular 
invention is contrary to the requirements of Article 53(a). The above argument was 
also rejected by the Technical Board which followed its decision in case T 1213/05. 
 Once more, in case T 0080/05, the Technical Board of Appeal confronted with 
the application of Article 53(a)37.  In this case, the patent proprietor lodged an appeal 
against the decision of the Opposition Division which had decided the revocation of 
European Patent No. 0 699 754. On the contrary, The Technical Board did not agree 
with the decision of the Opposition Division and refused to accept arguments based 
on Article 53(a), according to which, the patentability of the invention would probably 
lead to that the patients would not be able any more to preserve their genetic 
information in order to read and interpret them by the organization which they prefer; 
moreover, nobody could guarantee that the criminal and medical gene databases 
would be preserved separately as an  ethical principle of the EPO. Once again, the 
Board based on its decision in case T 1213/05 and, so, it did not accept arguments 
were depending on ethical issues. 
 The conclusion of all these three cases, is that there is a need for a uniform 
approach by all parts of the EPO, namely: the Examining Division, the Opposition 
Division and the Technical Board of Appeal and a single policy applied for the meaning 
and interpretation of Article 53(a). 
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 Plant Genetics and Article 53(a) 
 As regard plants and patentability, a morality issue appeared in the Lubrizol 
Transgene Expression case on 31 March 1992.38 In this case, many non-governmental 
organizations opposed demonstratively to the patentability of plants, supporting that 
patents on plants are contrary to morality on the basis of Article 53(a).  
 This invention concerned the creation of new plants whose nutritional value is 
much higher than the ordinary conventional plants. The Opposition Division 
supported that the exclusion from patentability of Article 53(a) is applied only in 
extreme cases which are characterized in a universal level as abhorrent. Therefore, 
the Opposition Division decided there in no violation of Article 53(a), arguing that the 
plants which the patent cover may increase the food storage in the world.  
 This case regarding plant patents is too important for three main reasons. The 
first is that this case it was the first one for plant patents, in respect to which, Article 
53(a) and its application was taken into consideration. Second, the conclusion of the 
case was that plants per se are not included in the exception of patentability. Third, it 
limited the scope of application of Article 53(a) to inventions which are considered as 
abhorrent. All above- mentioned shows that Article 53(a) proposes a “light” regime 
regarding morality. 
 Article’s 53(a) application was an issue in Plant Genetic Systems N.V. et al. 
(PGS). The patent was about plants and plant cells that where genetically modified 
and plant cells, which could resist to glutamine synthetase inhibitors (GSI) by inserting 
a single novel gene. In fact, modern biotechnological techniques were used in order 
to produce GSI-resistant plants and seeds that contained heterologous DNA which role 
was to encode a protein which had the capacity to activate the GSI herbicides. In 
respect to this procedure, a new characteristic was appeared in the genetic material 
of cells which gave the plant the possibility to grow even if an inhibitor is present. The 
Greenpeace Ltd and the environmental action group were opposite to that patent but 
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finally the Opposition Division did not accept the opposition and then Greenpeace 
lodged an appeal to the Technical Board of Appeal.39 
 An important issue in the appeal was the question if the claimed subject-
matter is included in the exceptions for granting a patent under the provision of Article 
53(a) EPC. What the Board did was to examine some previous documentation of the 
Patents Working Party regarding the establishment of the provision of Article 53 EPC. 
Those documents provided the Board with the information that in fact there is not an 
exact meaning of public ordre or morality in European level and therefore the 
interpretation of these meanings depends on European institutions. The Board in PGS 
decided that the term of public ordre includes also the public security, the protection 
of the environment and the physical integrity of individuals. In respect to the term of 
morality, the Board reached to the conclusion that such a concept could be 
interpreted as a behavior that is believed to be acceptable and right in contrast to 
other behavior that may be considered as wrong. This belief for public ordre and 
morality comes from the European society and civilization through years. On the 
contrary, the Board refused to accept the above- mentioned arguments which were 
exclusively based on surveys and opinion polls due to that the Board considered them 
insufficient to prove that they truly represent public opinion and did not correspond 
to the concepts of public ordre or morality. The Board’s justification concerning the 
rejection of surveys and polls, was that as national laws and regulations for the 
exploitation of an invention are not factors for interpreting the concept of public ordre 
or morality, neither are the surveys or polls.  
 On that point, we may notice three main issues. The first one is that the Board 
supported that interpretation of Article 53(a) belongs to the European institutions. 
The EPO jurisdiction concerning the refusion of patentability on terms of morality was 
depending on the historical documentation of the EPC. Although, this documentation 
constitutes a proof of that the Contracting States prevent the EPO from the power to 
deal deeper with moral issues. So, its jurisdiction regarding other moral issues is under 
dispute. The second one is that jurisdiction of the EPO was developed based on the 
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consensus given from the states. It is still unknown if there is a uniform acceptance 
among states of whether the meaning of public ordre includes also public security, 
protection of the environment and the physical integrity of individuals. In accordance 
to these, the EPO took the role of a ‘supranational’ authority as regards EU law. 
Despite the fact that the EPO had no de jure jurisdiction, is considered as the de facto 
organ regarding public ordre between states. The third one is, that based on the 
Board, the interpretation of morality refers to a “belief” which was created years 
before in European society and civilization, despite the fact that there is not enough 
evidence to provide us with the information that there is an inherent culture in 
European society. If this kind of culture really existed, then the second half-sentence 
of Article 53(a) regarding the law and regulations in the Contracting States would 
unnecessary. This point of the provision shows that a particular behavior that may be 
accepted in some states but not in others. 
 The appellants also suggested that exploitation of the invention may be 
harmful for the environment. As regards this argument, the Board supported that it 
concerned both morality and public ordre and is related to previous arguments of the 
appellants regarding the damage of the environment from the exploitation of the 
invention. All above- mentioned arguments are of complete relation to the dominant 
position of man towards nature and to the consequences of his actions to the 
environment. 
 The appellant’s argument was based on that the exploitation of the invention 
would give man’s power to dominate in nature, which is absolutely against the 
meaning of morality. In relation to this argument, the Board was opposed. Its rejecting 
decision was based on the fact that it could not accept that there is a crucial difference 
in respect to traditional breeding and breeding after biotechnological procedure. The 
Board supported that plants produced after biotechnological methods should not be 
considered to be contrary to morality in relation to the breeding taking place in a 
traditional way. The Board argued that traditional breeders and molecular biologists 
have Both traditional breeders and molecular biologists have the same motivation for 
modifying the property of a plant by the method of introducing new genetic material 
into the plant, for producing a new and improved plant. In respect to this method, the 
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Board argued that for understanding the way of how exactly this works, it was 
necessary to consolidate the mechanism of genetic engineering. In fact, genetic 
engineering is identical to selective breeding as regards the results of their performing 
with the only difference of that the genetic engineering has much more quick results. 
This does not mean that genetic engineering must be considered just as a quick 
procedure. Genetic engineering is a method for innovation, for creating something 
new, unknown since before and only for good purpose and in particular, for producing 
transgenic plants. The protection of innovation under the provisions of patent law, 
was legal for the ordinary breeding processes. 
 As regards the public ordre in relation to environmental issues, the appellant’s 
argument was that granting the patent for transgenic plant would be catastrophic for 
the environment and as a result it should be rejected. The Board was still opposite to 
that argument and the evidenced used were not enough to respond to the “balance 
of interests” approach that was used in Onco-Mouse case. The Board’s opinion was 
that while patent offices are between the dilemma of science on one hand and public 
policy on the other, the fact that the potential risks of the invention are mentioned on 
the application for granting patentability, is not enough to be correctly assessed. The 
right of exploiting an invention is determined in accordance to the legal framework 
that is formed by national laws and regulations that refer to the use of the invention. 
The assessment of the risks coming from the use of technology is a matter that 
regulatory authorities have undertake due to that they have the power to estimate 
the risks based on realistic, scientific criteria and to apply the proper regulation. The 
Board reached to the conclusion that the revocation of a patent due to that the 
exploitation of it would lead to the damage of  the environment it implies that the 
threat was justifiable at the time when the decision for revocation was taking place by 
the EPO. The fact that the appellant’s argument about the damage of the ecosystem 
was not sufficiently proven, the assessment of patentability based on the “balancing 
exercise” of the advantages and disadvantages of the patent is not the appropriate 
one.  The Board’ s opinion was that despite its doubts, it was against public ordre and 
morality to approve a misuse or a destructive use depending on the “balance test” 
approach. What the Board examined was the purpose of the creation of invention, 
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reaching to the decision that the production of seeds and plants that are resistant to 
a specific kind of herbicide was essential. Therefore, the Board reached to the 
conclusion that the claims regarding the subject-matter were in relation to a misuse 
or to a destructive use of biotechnological techniques performed on plants.  
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 Conclusions 
 According to all above- mentioned, we reach to the conclusion that Onco-
Mouse case proves that EPO has still not have the capacity of providing sufficient 
guidelines in order to establish criteria regarding public order and morality on the 
basis of Article 53(a). This witnesses that patent examiners are incapable of ruling 
moral matters based on the meaning and interpretation of Article 53(a). The Howard/ 
Relaxin case proves that there is a confusion of the Office as regard the application of 
Article 53(a), due to the fact that the assessment of morality issues in patent law is 
still confusing and problematic. The PGS case supports the idea that a clear definition 
of public ordre and morality on the basis of state’s practice is needed. What 
jurisprudence proves is that the application of Article 53(a) as a means of assessing 
morality and public ordre regarding the patentability of an invention, provides 
doubtful results. What is needed in a European level, is the establishment of a uniform 
and exact approach of interpretation of the concepts of morality and public ordre as 
regards patentability of inventions  
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